

Doctrinal Transformations of the Egyptian Army after the British Evacuation

Asst. Prof. Dr. Qutaiba Abdel Azim Kazem *, Saleh Salman Abdulatee

College of Arts - Iraqi University

Abstract

The research entitled "The Doctrinal Transformations of the Egyptian Army after the British Expulsion" deals with the definition of the developments that Egypt witnessed in the wake of the British evacuation from its lands in 1954, and its impact on the military doctrine of the Egyptian army, represented by the tripartite aggression in 1956, the Yemen war in 1961, and the setback of June in 1967, As each of these events has contributed to strengthening or adding a new belief in which the sons of the Egyptian military establishment believed and fought for it.

Keywords: Doctrinal Transformations, Egyptian Army

Introduction

The British evacuation from Egyptian lands in 1954 is a pivotal turning point in the history of the Egyptian military institution, which was fully entrusted with the task of preserving the security and safety of the country and warding off external dangers. The military institution faced a number of challenges during which it played an important and decisive role, such as the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, which among its goals was to curb the development, supremacy and growth of the Egyptian military power, the Yemen war in 1961 and the setback of June 1967, all of those challenges that naturally affected the military doctrine of the Egyptian army, in addition to well-established principles of open hostility to the Zionist entity, which became a fundamental principle and the growth of the national spirit. In addition, the role played by the military institution in these events was not limited to the military side, but went beyond that to its control of political affairs and its interference in the country's economic system. For this reason, the research sheds light on all these variables and the extent of the ideological transformations that they have brought about among the sons of the Egyptian military establishment.

First: The political and ideological influences of the Egyptian army after the tripartite aggression

The Suez Canal has a great connection to the history of Egypt. Since its establishment, the canal has faced many important stages that had an impact on the general situation in Egypt, starting with its opening by French companies in 1869, passing through its entry into British ownership after purchasing the shares of the company that manages it, until it became The profits of the Suez Canal are in the pockets of French and British companies at a time when Egypt was suffering from financial crises.

The Suez Canal was considered an international canal that Egypt had no right to control. Rather, it was in order to make any measure, change or modification in the canal that France and Britain had to be consulted, meaning that the company, although it was on Egyptian lands and built with Egyptian hands, it A foreign company, so the decision to nationalize was a decision against colonialism .

The order of the Suez Canal was applicable to all aspects of life in Egypt, as (French-British) colonialism controlled all the capabilities of the country, and this did not change until members of the military

1412

* Corresponding Author

establishment took over the administration of the country. It was official until he followed a policy based on the independence of Egypt in all political, economic and military aspects. Therefore, the first decision taken by Gamal Abdel Nasser was the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal on the twenty-sixth of July 1956, and this decision came in response to the statements of US Secretary of State Foster Dulles. Foster Dulles when he stated, "The Egyptian economy is collapsing," referring to Egypt's inability to complete the High Dam project, especially after the European countries refused to finance it.

The goal of nationalizing the Suez Canal was not only to complete the High Dam project, but there were military goals that lie in the new Egyptian army doctrine, as well as political and economic goals. It can be said that the most important goals that prompted the Egyptian government to nationalize the Suez Canal are the military goals. After the Egyptian revolution, the Egyptian policy changed in general and in all aspects, the most important of which was the military. Gamal Abdel Nasser refused to follow the policy of military alliances, especially with foreign countries. He was not satisfied with that, but he was pushing the Arab countries to stay away from these alliances. Nasser worked to follow a military policy aimed at ridding Egypt of colonial control of the Egyptian military system, and he also worked to break the monopoly of arms and not rely on one direction to import it, but rather diversified the sources of bringing arms, especially from the eastern bloc represented by the Soviet Union .

What confirms this is Nasser's statement to US Secretary of State Dulles when the latter offered him Egypt's joining a military alliance against the Soviet Union.).

The decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was not accepted by Britain and France, because they found it an end to their political, economic and military influence in Egypt, and it would, from their point of view, lead to the strengthening of Egypt in all aspects, and this contradicts the colonial policy. From October 1956 its attack on Egypt was supported by Britain and France. The two countries issued a warning to Egypt and the Zionist entity to withdraw from the Suez Canal, and Egypt to accept the British presence in Port Said and Ismailia in order to protect navigation there, , and in the researcher's point of view This matter and the British and French position are considered a political, military and even moral alliance in the principles of international politics, in addition to highlighting the meanings of power in Britain and France and their dominance over another country that has its history in terms of civilization, its land and its history, and the depth of its authentic heritage, not to mention the extent of the insult. All these matters have prompted the Egyptian army to change all its ideological foundations, which have had a profound impact on the core of politics and the market. This army's mobilization.

Among the things that confirm that the tripartite aggression was directed against the development, supremacy and growth of the Egyptian military power, in addition to that it was directed against Egypt's political influence in the region is what was quoted from some British officials, and it came in its text: "Britain, for example, did not try to hide the buried roots of its work." Against Egypt, Egypt's military power, as one of the English officials in the British House of Commons said, has become a threat to Britain, and Egypt's political influence in the region has become, as the same English officials said, a threat to Britain's influence.

As soon as this threat reached Egypt, Abdel Nasser revealed it in a speech at Al-Azhar Mosque, declaring the Egyptian army's readiness to resist by saying: ((We will fight everywhere, and we will not surrender, and the slogan of each of us in the armed forces and the people will be: We will fight and we will not surrender), and in order to encourage the people to participate with the army forces in repelling the aggression , Abdel Nasser broadcast this speech from Al-Azhar Mosque in an important reference to the role of the religious institution in supporting the army in such events, and this is a new concept and doctrine in the mechanism of the military market and in the field The tactical army of thought, theory and combat.

The goal of the tripartite aggression was to disperse the military power of the Egyptian army, by attacking it from three fronts, the Zionist entity from the eastern side. As soon as the Egyptian forces were busy confronting it, Britain and France would control the Suez Canal, meaning that the Egyptian army would attack from the east, west and north; The aim of this is to destroy the Egyptian army, but all the moves followed by Britain, France and the Zionist entity failed after the United States of America stood against the tripartite aggression, desiring not to make room for the continuation of Britain and France's power and limit their influence in the world. The Soviet position was clear not to allow any power to monopolize its influence and strengthen it in the region, and to support all national liberation

movements in the world that seek to stand against global imperialism and spread communist thought in the region. The tripartite imposed on Egypt the weaknesses of the Egyptian army, and it was imperative for the Egyptian government to follow a serious policy in order to reform it and find a new strategy that fits with the events and the course of the situation between the regional and international powers .

The tripartite aggression against Egypt, after its withdrawal, brought about many variables, and it has proven many things that were considered a fixed doctrine for the Egyptian army, including the confirmation of the Egyptian-Israeli hostility. Although Egypt has achieved a political victory against the tripartite aggression, its army has suffered defeats. A large military front is in front of him, and perhaps this is due to the power of the tripartite aggression consisting of two large countries (Britain and France), who have a long history in wars, and possess a huge war arsenal ready to fight such a conflict, as well as the Zionist occupation forces and their military arsenal, in contrast to the Egyptian army, which His strength and capabilities did not qualify him to engage in such a conflict, which established a firm belief in the hearts of its members based on hatred and hostility to the Zionist entity and the colonial powers .

One of the results of the tripartite aggression was the adoption of a new mobilization and ideological policy in the army based on reorganization and training, the preparation of new units whose existence the battles proved necessary, and changes in the structure of the Egyptian army, and these changes were related to the course of the fighting, as the battles of the tripartite aggression showed the presence of many aspects Which must be filled, and among these changes that have been created in the army are the expansion of the paratroopers forces, and the adoption of a new strategy based on mobilization and moral guidance and the intensification of training in combat in general in line with the nature of the land and time, as well as a new strategy based on training the army in battles In addition to the army's interest in preparing mobile maintenance workshops to accompany the forces in order to repair the damage caused to military equipment in the field . Nasser also made among his most important goals, which he sought to achieve, to build a superior military force capable of facing external dangers, and to follow a new military policy and doctrine based on the Egyptian national production of weapons instead of importing them from abroad. Its range is (36) km on Egyptian territory, and it also worked to benefit from German experts in this aspect . In addition to adopting a new policy based on planting the doctrine of patriotism and sacrificing for it in the hearts of citizens, and preparing them to defend it alongside the military forces at any time, by including young people who are able to participate in the fighting in military training courses, and to follow the doctrine and policy It is based on the hatred of Egyptian citizens and members of the army for any form of occupation or colonialism .

Also, the changes were not limited to preparation and organization, but included the leaders, as many of those who doubted their loyalty to the British or those with class ideas in society were dismissed for being an obstacle element in the implementation of the ideological policy of this army, in addition to the resignation of some leaders themselves; This is due to her feeling of negligence in the leadership of the army, including Abdel Hakim Amer , but Abdel Nasser refused his resignation, and the commander of the Air Force, Major General Sidqi Mahmoud, was dismissed .

The end of the tripartite aggression against Egypt and its evacuation from its lands is a dividing line between two eras, as Egypt and the region were under the brunt of British and French colonial control, and the evacuation of the aggression marks the end of foreign military intervention in the region, in addition to the fact that the tripartite aggression was a reason to change Egypt's regional position As Abdel Nasser emerged as an Arab leader, Egypt's regional status rose, and the Egyptian army, although it did not achieve a complete victory, became one of the important armies in the region; He was able to stand in front of the armies of three countries, two of which were considered one of the strongest armies in the world at the time .

One of the important results of the tripartite aggression is a major change in the Egyptian army, represented by an increase in interest in it, as well as the growth of national feeling among its members, and this also resulted in a merger between the Egyptian army and the Syrian army , and this union was not limited to the military institution alone, Rather, it was a comprehensive union between Egypt and Syria, as it culminated in the Egyptian-Syrian unity on February 22, 1958, and the state resulting from the union was called the (United Arab Republic), and this unity was based on the foundations of Arab nationalism, but it did not last. Long, as the two countries separated in 1961 .

Also, some of the changes that occurred in the military institution were not limited to the military aspect only, but increased its interest in the economic aspect as well, as the army intervened in the country's economic policy by adopting many targeted economic projects that contributed to building the infrastructure of the Egyptian country in general, and the military institution has prepared Major projects that contributed to urban development and the strengthening of Egyptian capabilities in the field of industry and construction.

Second: The Egyptian Military Doctrine and the Yemen War in 1961

Yemen witnessed revolutionary movements in order to overthrow the frontal system of government in it, and replace it with a republican regime. In 1961 in order to end the monarchy and replace it with a republican rule, and this organization included officers of small ranks, and the number of about forty officers, and this organization had branches in many Yemeni cities .

Therefore, as soon as he died in front of Yemen, and his son, Prince Muhammad Al-Badr took over after him, the Yemeni officers announced the revolution in September 1962, and they were able to control the rule and executed Muhammad Al-Badr, and announced the republican rule in Yemen, which was recognized by many countries, including Egypt , as the Egyptian government was aware of what was going on in Yemen, as it was aware of the formation of the Yemeni Free Officers Organization, and it provided them with a helping hand and assistance. After sending Sadat to see the situation in Yemen, he decided to provide military aid to the revolution by sending a squadron of Egyptian planes to help the revolutionaries. After that, three warplanes, and a number of Egyptian Thunderbolt forces headed to Yemen, and they formed the first Egyptian command center there .

And the leader of the Yemeni revolution, Abdullah al-Sallal , emerged, who was not satisfied with the military assistance provided by Egypt in the form of aircraft, but also sent to Abdel Nasser asking him for more military reinforcements. In these days the most difficult problem, which requires us to have more forces and more preparations to face this critical situation.

The presence of the Egyptian forces in Yemen continued until their withdrawal in 1968. The Egyptian military presence in Yemen affected Egypt and its military strength, especially in the political and economic aspects. However, the most important impact of the Yemen war on Egypt is on the military side. This is because the intervention was a military intervention, and the effects of the Yemen war for the Egyptian army were the subject of disagreement, as the biggest difference was its impact on the 1967 war .

The Yemen war had a great impact on the Egyptian army's combat capabilities, as the human losses of the Egyptian army in which it participated amounted to nearly ten thousand dead, in addition to large numbers of wounded, which prompted the leadership of the Egyptian army to work on reorganizing it again .

Among the effects that the Yemen war left on the Egyptian army, which can be considered negative and positive at the same time, which greatly affected the thinking of the Egyptian soldier, his military doctrine and his policy in dealing with the armies of enemies, is the high morale that the members of the Egyptian army have become, which has reached the point of vanity, Many soldiers and officers were awarded medals and promotions, so that army members became less likely to the enemy, and at the same time, this matter was a motive in raising the morale of the army forces, increasing their self-confidence, and their fighting abilities .

The effects that the Yemen war left on the Egyptian army were not only limited to the soldiers, their numbers and morale, but the effects also included the economic structure of the Egyptian army, as the expenditures directed to the development of the Egyptian army decreased, due to the spending directed to the Yemen war, in addition to the economic impact of the Yemen war, which affected And largely on the new military policy and doctrine that Egypt has taken towards the army, which is based on building weapons factories and reducing dependence on foreign countries in the field of armament. However, the Yemen war and its economic impact prevented the development of this aspect, and the economic aspect prevented the construction of airports, and the formation of units In addition, he reduced spending on training the army units and equipping them with the lacking equipment , that the Yemen war did not include any military counter action by the enemy forces on the Egyptian planes, meaning that the Egyptian planes remained without actual training for four Years, which was the period that preceded the 1967 war, this matter was considered a clear negative factor in the lack of development of the combat capabilities of the Egyptian Air Force, which in turn failed to fight at the air

level in the June War of 1967.

But some military and political historians consider the war in Yemen to have positive aspects, which were represented in raising the ability of the Egyptian armed forces to fight with live ammunition, that is, it was a reason for increasing the efficiency of the Egyptian forces, and increased their ability to move and supply forces, and replace them with other forces, in addition to that The Yemen war developed the Egyptian army's strategy in combat, by choosing the appropriate location for the army, and it also increased the Egyptian army's experience in using weapons, and developing them to suit the wars waged by the Egyptian army, and increased the efficiency of the Egyptian army in fighting in mountainous areas, and it seems to the researcher unfamiliar matter, perhaps this is a relative matter, but compared to the fighting that took place in the June 1967 war, this represents a clear setback. Where are those advantages that these people talked about, in addition to that, the Egyptian army, its weapons and equipment, were not suitable for those battles in Yemen, which He pushed the Egyptian army to develop its weapons, equipment and military vehicles in line with the wars that this army is waging in areas other than its Egyptian lands. In order to innovate ways and methods of supply that fit with the areas in which the army forces are fighting, the battles of Yemen showed the importance of the engineers accompanying the military operations by helping to build roads and making temporary airports for landing planes. Be able to fight in different conditions.

However, the most dangerous thing that the war in Yemen left on the military doctrine in the Egyptian army participating in the fighting there is the lack of military discipline, and the prevalence of nepotism and favoritism in obtaining promotions, or medals and an increase in salary, as well as the exploitation of the position for personal reasons, until the matter came to the demand of the Egyptian officers In Yemen, they take the secondary certificate exam for their children and relatives in Yemen instead of in Egypt, so that a number of those who failed the secondary exam in Egypt moved to Yemen two or three times in order to take the exam there and succeed in it.

From this section, the army's condition was not conducive to entering into a war with Israel, as the army was not prepared for a war. The Egyptian forces lacked training, and their military level was low, and their combat capabilities also decreased, and the Egyptian military equipment was not prepared for war. In terms of maintenance, as well as studies that tracked the situation of the Egyptian army, which indicated the inability to confront the Zionist entity by mentioning: ((It is not correct to be involved in carrying out military operations against Israel at this time and for a period to come, as long as our armed forces are involved in this size in Yemen). (In addition to the above, the attention of the Egyptian political and military leaders towards Yemen and the military operations in it led to the neglect of the preparation of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, and the theater of their operations there, meaning that the Egyptian forces were not prepared or trained in order to stand up to the Zionist forces in the necessary manner. In addition to the fact that the points of defense against any possible Zionist attack in the Sinai were not well equipped, as it was content with preparing one defensive line, which is close to the Egyptian-Eastern border, while the rest of the defensive lines were neglected.

Third: The political, military and ideological influences on the setback of June 1967.

During the period between 1956 and 1967, Egypt and the Arab region witnessed the beginning of a new phase of the conflict, and witnessed several variables that affected its policy, including the rise of the nationalist trend, and the increasing attempts of colonial countries to impose their control over it, and the Zionist entity was afraid of developments in The region considered it a threat to its security. Among these developments was the joint defense agreement that Egypt signed with Syria in October 1966, as well as the great rapprochement that took place between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

The region was prepared for war, and one of the indications of this matter is that the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army informed the commander of the United Nations forces deployed in it that the Egyptian army had begun to deploy its forces in eastern Sinai and raise its readiness in order to confront any Zionist aggression against any Arab country, as well as his request to withdraw the United Nations forces from Region.

The researcher believes that these political and military steps were not well studied, as they were hasty steps that were not based on knowledge or knowledge, and this is confirmed by the results that resulted from them. The Egyptian leadership decided to move its forces and restore those areas by force, and among the decisions that marked the beginning of the war between the Zionist entity and Egypt was the decision to close the Strait of Tiran in front of the Zionist ships, in addition to the lack

of satisfaction of the Zionist entity with the results it obtained after the aggression The tripartite, and the researcher believes that these attitudes have prompted the Zionist entity to prepare its army morally, ideologically and militarily in the face of the Egyptian army, unlike the Egyptian army, which was preoccupied with wars and many aspirations in different regions in the Arab world and Africa, and thus the Zionist entity was preparing for Fighting the June War of 1967, and there were several factors identified by the Zionist entity that would help it achieve victory in this war, the most important of which was that the Arab military capabilities were weak at the time, as the Egyptian army was exhausted and scattered. As for the Yemen war in 1963, meaning that he was not ready to fight a new war, in addition to the fact that the Arab armies, including the Egyptian army, did not enjoy the theory of national security, and this matter in itself constituted a clear defect in the Egyptian military doctrine, as it was not said that it constituted a deficiency factor among the factors of mobilization. To defend the homeland, since we considered that the Arab forces, including the Egyptian ones in particular, are linked to the power of authority in their countries, and that their military doctrine was based on the principle of preserving the system of government in the first place, and after that, preserving the security of the state .

Therefore, the Zionist entity began to attack the Arab countries in order to push them to war, as the Israeli Air Force attacked and bombed a Jordanian village on the thirteenth of November 1966, and this bombing led to the killing of nearly seventy Jordanian citizens, and the argument of the Israelis in this matter was Attacking the bases of the fedayeen, and Israel was not satisfied with this, but it also attacked the Syrian border, citing the fedayeen as well, and its goal in this attack is to provoke Egypt, which was linked to a joint defense agreement with Syria, and indeed Egypt worked to deploy its forces and prepare in Sinai, as we mentioned previously .

As a result of these deteriorating conditions of the Arab armies, the first of which is the Egyptian army, the Zionist entity began its attack on the fifth of June 1967 with planes on the Egyptian military airports and destroyed the planes that were sitting on the grounds of its airports; With this, the Egyptian air force came out of the combat theater, and after that the advance of the Zionist forces accompanied by air support began and was able to achieve progress at the expense of the Arab countries. The entirety of the West Bank is from Jordan, and the Golan Heights is from Syria.

At the same time, the Egyptian army did not deal seriously with the dangers surrounding it, although its leaders were aware of the intention of the Israeli army to attack Egypt, and that its first goal would be to destroy the Egyptian air force, but it did not take any precautionary measures regarding this matter, when the air force attacked The Israeli Egyptian airports Most of the planes were clearly scattered on the ground of the airports, which made them easy targets for the forces , and this matter shows the extent of neglect and lack of interest, and the lack of clarity of vision of the Egyptian military and political leadership, which proves that the Egyptian army's doctrine had not entered the minds of some Among them, and confirms that the general strategy and military doctrine of the Egyptian forces present in Sinai was purely defensive, meaning that their strategy was based on repelling any Israeli attack towards Sinai, destroying any military force that invaded the defense line and preventing it from advancing towards Suez, but this matter required strength. A large military force, that is, to carry out this task, the army needed all its forces, including the forces present in Yemen , in addition, the Egyptian forces did not assess the reasons for their military defeat in the 1956 war, nor did they take any action. six and correct the mistakes it caused, so that it did not take the necessary measures to avoid falling into them again, in addition to the political decision's interference with the military decision. The first attack will be by the Zionist occupation forces, despite the fact that the Egyptian government was aware of the Zionists' intention to attack Egypt, and this matter caused the Egyptian army to lose most of its air forces and weapons .

One of the most important reasons that led to the setback was a matter related to the military doctrine of the Egyptian army. There was a defect in the function of the army and the officers in particular. The army's job is based on defending the homeland and not being preoccupied with matters of politics. Army officers were not trained to be legislators and politicians, but rather They were prepared to fight, and this matter was not present in the Egyptian army, and most of the armies of the Arab world and the third world , as the army became a partisan tool serving the interests of the ruling party, in addition to the fact that the link between it and the people was very weak to the extent that the army did not adhere to its usual existing mission defending the homeland, but was more preoccupied with protecting the government, or the ruling party, this was the case of the Egyptian army, while the Israeli

occupation army was on the contrary, as the connection between the army and the people was greater than it is in the Egyptian army, and we infer that By looking at the number of regular forces affiliated with the Israeli army participating in the 1967 war and the number of citizens' reserves in these forces, the regular forces amounted to approximately (60) thousand fighters, while the reserves exceeded (200) thousand .

One of the results of a setback war on the Egyptian army was the deterioration of its structure, as well as the large human losses of the military, as the number of soldiers who were killed in this war was approximately (15) thousand fighters between an officer and a soldier, in addition to that this war led to a widening of the differences between the leadership Political and military leadership .

The Egyptian government has become represented by its political and military leaders looking at its military situation and its military plans that it aims to achieve in the future in a more realistic way, and away from intimidation and high morale, which are not consistent with the capabilities of the Egyptian army on the battlefield, so the policy and objectives of the state and the Egyptian forces towards the Zionist presence changed. From the complete liberation of Palestine to a policy based on eliminating the impact of aggression, that is, the doctrine of the Egyptian army has become based on its real capabilities .

Among the matters that led to the setback were doctrinal matters related to the army's military doctrine and the extent of its commitment to this doctrine based on loyalty to the homeland and defending it.

1- The Egyptian army's involvement in political matters, which has made it lose many of the important foundations needed to build any strong army, such as discipline, obedience to orders, and the importance of the military rank.

2- One of the disadvantages of the army's involvement in politics is the division among its members - and the loss of group spirit and teamwork during military missions.

3- As a result of the involvement of senior army officers in politics and the occurrence of political differences among them, some of them resorted to getting rid of each other, which caused the army to lose a number of its best leaders.

4- The military forces' interest in politics led to the senior officers' preoccupation with it, and their neglect to develop their military expertise and increase their leadership and planning skills.

One of the results of the setback at the internal level was that the tension and alienation between the authority, especially the political, and the people, especially the youth group, increased, who held the political leadership responsible for the setback and the responsibility of not building a strong army capable of protecting the security of the country and its borders , and the setback had a great impact on the regime based in Egypt, and on his political and military vision, and made the Egyptian regime reconsider its military leaders, and their ability to plan .

The setback also showed the big difference between the Israeli military capabilities in terms of armament, and between the Arab and Egyptian military and armament capabilities in particular. The Israeli forces depended on the western axis represented in the United States, Britain and France for their armament, which provided them with many advanced weapons, unlike the Egyptian army. And the rest of the Arab armies that depended on weapons from the eastern axis represented by the Soviet Union, and these weapons were less technically efficient, and therefore were not suitable for fighting battles in which the most advanced and deadly weapons were used.

After the setback, Egypt worked to reorganize its military forces on new ideological foundations based on:

1- Working to increase cohesion and cohesion between the military forces and the Egyptian people, and to reduce the distance and disharmony that existed between them.

2- Accelerating the construction of defensive military lines to stand up to the Zionist forces and prevent them from benefiting from the military progress they have achieved.

3- Not relying on the military side only in dealing with the Zionist entity and repelling its attack, but also relying on the political side in order to end the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands.

4- Strengthening relations between Egypt and the Arab countries, as well as increasing its relations with the Soviet Union, especially in the field of armament.

5- The military doctrine of the Egyptian army should be based on defending Egypt's borders against any danger that invades it, and working to restore all occupied lands by military force, meaning that the army must be reorganized, trained and armed in a new and good way, in line with the requirements

of the battle.

6- Removing the army from the civilian duties it was previously assigned to, especially the Military Intelligence Service; This apparatus is devoted to intelligence work against the enemy, and not to contact the citizens.

7- Work to restore military discipline among the army personnel, and to abide by military orders .

8- Amending the decision based on granting the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces the application of military provisions .

9- Work to develop and modernize the engineering apparatus with modern equipment, so that the Egyptian forces can establish alternative sites and maintain and develop weapons.

10- Abolition of many offices that require routine procedures, as they conflict with the terms of reference of the army. The Minister of War Muhammad Fawzi gave the army commanders the right to break the routine in order to preserve the forces and their weapons, by saying ((I will not object to any procedure taken by the army commander Personally, it brings costs to the minister, but his goal is prevention.

11- Work to raise the morale of the Egyptian army in various ways, including giving the Medal of Courage to every Egyptian soldier who captures an Israeli soldier.

As a result, the Egyptian army followed a new military doctrine based on military competence in assuming senior officers in positions such as Muhammad Fawzi, and carrying out new reforms in the military system , As for the Egyptian army's doctrine towards the Zionist occupation of part of the Egyptian lands, it was based on the saying ((What was taken by force can only be recovered by force, a saying that President Abdel Nasser expressed and used as a goal, as well as strengthening the morale and combativeness in the military doctrine of the Egyptian army, and prepared as a method of action in the war of attrition, and the future march of the Egyptian army .

The Egyptian army has adopted a new strategy based on three stages in order to stand up to the Zionist forces. The first stage is passive defense or steadfastness, the second stage is positive defense or deterrence, and the third and final stage is represented by the liberation of Egyptian lands .

Fourth: Assessing the role of the principles of the Egyptian army's doctrine from the 1956-1967 war.

The Egyptian army has played, and continues to play, a major role in the political decision-making in Egypt, and it has been helped by the good legacy that the military gained and has remained in the minds of Egyptians. This also applies to the military doctrine of the Egyptian army, for its members were not controlled by certain ideological tendencies, as there were no leftist, right-wing or religious extremist beliefs, but rather the prevailing doctrine among the army personnel was a doctrine of national independence, and disassociation from parties in all its forms . The conflict between the military and political institutions greatly developed between 1961 and 1962. The actions of some Egyptian officers, especially those close to Abdel Hakim Amer, led to the end of the Egyptian-Syrian union. For this, Abdel Nasser worked to separate the tasks of the political and military authorities. Leading the army to leaders who are far from political matters, and although Abdul Hakim Amer accepted this at first, he later rejected it as a result of pressure from the army not to accept the decision, so Abdul Hakim Amer threatened to submit his resignation, and the matter did not stop there. As a result of the loyalty of the army personnel, including officers and soldiers, to Abdel Hakim Amer, a number of them gathered and organized what was described as a military demonstration. With more powers and authorities.

The decisions issued by the political or military leadership had a great impact on the army and its movements, so the presence of organization and coordination between the military and political institutions is important in organizing the army and its work, and although the political aspect in Egypt after the revolution became in the hands of military leaders, the This does not mean that there are no differences between politicians who are originally former military personnel and army leaders, despite the fact that Abdel Hakim Amer, commander of the Egyptian army, was the closest of the Free Officers to Gamal Abdel Nasser, and that the relationship between the two seemed good throughout the extended period since the establishment of The revolution and even the 1967 war, but those close to the two men know that there are differences of opinion between them, related to the management of the army, its doctrine and its general policy, and those differences emerged clearly after the setback of June and the subsequent signs .

During this period, the military establishment was not only preoccupied with military action and the

development of the army on ideological foundations based on protecting the homeland. Rather, it always interfered in political affairs, and tried to show that the army was the safety valve for the political process, just as the army commander, Abdul Hakim Amer, was the owner of the army. Strong influence among members of the military forces, and he worked on making the army force the only protector of order and authority in Egypt, to the extent that the army became afraid that the political establishment would surround itself with a mass mobilization that would support it, in order to continue its influence on the political affairs of the state .

The interference in political affairs by the military establishment was rejected by those who represent the political authority. Therefore, we find that the political leadership represented by the person of Gamal Abdel Nasser was trying to monopolize political affairs in the country, as well as political matters that have military consequences, and this matter was explicitly represented by a nationalization decision The Suez Canal, which was taken individually by the political leadership represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser, did not inform anyone of the nationalization decision, even the army commander Abdul Hakim Amer, who did not know about the matter until the last moments when Abdel Nasser and Abdul Hakim Amer were heading by train from Cairo to Alexandria in order to announce The decision to nationalize, which aroused the anger and resentment of Abdul Hakim Amer, who saw that such a decision must be studied from all political, military and economic aspects , and Abdul Hakim Amer responded to this matter by saying (You should consult me to find out whether the forces The armed forces are able to protect this decision, and I think that this matter is untrue because the decision to nationalize was taken and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council were meeting in Abdel Nasser's house, and some members of the armed forces objected. A council on the decision, while others showed a reckless stance from him, including Abdul Hakim Amer, who did not express a clear opinion about it, then Abdel Nasser took on himself the responsibility of making the decision in front of everyone, so how could Abdul Hakim not know about it?

This proves that the military leadership had a different opinion in matters of war. After Britain and France issued an ultimatum to the Egyptian government in order to withdraw their forces from the canal, Abdul Hakim Amer's opinion was to accept the ultimatum and withdraw from the canal, knowing that the Egyptian army was unable to confront the forces of the canal. Three countries combined, but the opinion of the political establishment represented by Gamal Abdel Nasser was contrary to the opinion of the military force represented by Abdul Hakim Amer, so the Egyptian government refused the ultimatum and the war in which Egypt lost militarily but won politically , which means that Abdel Nasser was betting on The battle was resolved politically, and this is what actually happened.

As for the June 1967 war, the matter was completely different. The situation was military rather than political, and Abdul Hakim Amer vowed to Imam Abdel Nasser to achieve victory, by saying: "Oh, chief, my neck is our victory." And enjoying what Abdul Hakim was bestowing on them, and traveling outside Egypt, and Abdul Hakim's goal was to obtain the loyalties of the senior leaders of the Egyptian army without the political leader, and that the military defeat of the army clearly showed the extent of the dispute between Abdel Nasser and Abdul Hakim Amer, Abdel Nasser directed criticism Many of the military establishment were held responsible for the military defeat, and Nasser took a number of measures to reform the military establishment. These reforms included some changes in the general leadership of the army, which was rejected by the army commander Abdul Hakim, who enjoyed a high position and strong influence among the members of the military establishment, which led He pushed Abdel Nasser to comply with Abdul Hakim Amer's wishes and repeal all previous changes .

Conflicts and disagreements between the political establishment and the military establishment renewed during the 1967 war, but the pace this time was greater and more influential on the army and the extent of its cohesion and organization. The military capabilities of the army, especially towards Israel, until it came to holding Abdel Nasser responsible for the defeat in the 1967 war, as he kept Abdul Hakim Amer in command of the army, and these differences affected the Egyptian army, which led to the setback of 1967 .

Indeed, Abdel Nasser made changes in the leadership of the army, including the dismissal of Abdul Hakim Amer, and this matter sparked a strong conflict between Abdel Nasser and Abdul Hakim Amer and his loyalists, so that Abdul Hakim left the military establishment and retreated in his home without announcing his resignation, and began collecting Soldiers and officers loyal to him turned his house into a military barracks, and the military forces and officers loyal to Abdul Hakim Amer began organizing a military demonstration. Al-Hakim Amer became a headquarters for those who opposed

Nasser's rule and those plotting to overthrow his rule. The officer was chivalrous, but it became clear to me that the matter was much more than that, and that there was a conspiracy against me led by the Field Marshal.

Indeed, Abdel Nasser met Abdel Hakim Amer at the presidential headquarters, and the weapons of his companions were confiscated and removed from him. Abdel Nasser confronted Abdel Hakim Amer with all his coup intentions, and demanded him to resign from his position in the army command, in order to make the necessary changes to modernize the army, and Abdel Hakim Amer refused the matter. After putting pressure on him, he committed suicide, but the doctors succeeded in saving him, after which he was placed under house arrest and no one was allowed to meet him other than his family, so he committed suicide for the second time in mid-September 1967, and the leadership of the army became directly subordinate to Abdel Nasser .

Conclusion

The tripartite aggression on Egypt revealed the weaknesses of the Egyptian army, and it was imperative for the Egyptian government to follow a serious policy in order to reform it. It also established a firm belief in the hearts of the army personnel based on hatred and hostility to the Zionist entity and the colonial powers, as well as the growth of national sentiment.

The Yemen war had a significant impact on the Egyptian army's combat capabilities, as it reduced spending on training army units and equipping them with the lacking equipment. This war also strengthened the army's self-confidence, which reached the point of vanity and underestimating the capabilities of the enemy. This, in turn, affected the extent of the Egyptian army's readiness to confront the Zionist aggression in 1967.

In the wake of the setback of June 1967, represented by its political and military leaders, the Egyptian government began to look at its military plans in a more realistic way, and away from intimidation and high morale, which are not consistent with the capabilities of the Egyptian army on the battlefield, and the policy and objectives of the state and the Egyptian forces towards the Zionist presence have changed from The complete liberation of Palestine into a policy based on eliminating the impact of aggression.

It is noted that the Egyptian army is not committed to its usual mission based on defending the homeland, and its preoccupation with protecting the government or the ruling party, which weakened the connection between it and the people. The only regime and authority in Egypt, which ignited conflicts and disagreements between the political establishment and the military establishment.

References

1. Latif Muhammad Salem, *The Suez Crisis (1954-1957)*, Madbouly Library, Cairo, D.T., p. 147.
2. Abd al-Rahman al-Rifai, *The Revolution of July 23, 1952, Our National History in Seven Years 1952-1959*, 2nd Edition, Dar al-Maaref, Cairo, 1989, p. 261.
3. Hoda Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Sixty Years after the July 23 Revolution*, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Academic Library, Giza, 2013, Vol. 1, pp. 19-22.
4. John Foster Dulles: One of the prominent American politicians, born in 1888, studied at both Princeton University in the United States, and the French Sorbonne University, Dulles is considered the author of American foreign policy, died in 1959. See: Fahd Abbas Suleiman Al-Sabawi, *Syrian-Saudi relations 1946 -1958: A Study in the History of Diplomacy*, Dar Al Moataz for Publishing and Distribution, d.m., 2016, p. 228.
5. Abdul Aziz Mustafa Kamel, *The Secularists and Palestine: Sixty Years of Failure and What Next*, Al-Bayan Library, Riyadh, D.T., p. 20.
6. Abdullah Imam, *Tales from Abdel Nasser*, People's Press, Cairo, D.T., p. 86.
7. Sydney Bailey, *The Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process*, translated by: Elias Farhat, Dar Al Harf Al Arabi, Beirut, 1992, p. 105.
8. Abdullah Imam, *Wajih Abaza, Pages from the National Struggle*, Dar Al-Jihad, d.m., 1995, pp. 107-108.
9. Abdel Azim Ramadan, *The Historical Truth about the Decision to Nationalize the Suez Canal Company*, General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo, 2000, p. 110.
10. Abdel Rahman Al-Rafei, *Introductions to the July 23 Revolution*, 3rd Edition, Dar Al-Maaref, Cairo, 1987, pp. 282-283.

11. Mohsen Muhammad Salih, *The Palestinian Question, Its Historical Background and Contemporary Developments*, Al-Zaytoun Center for Studies and Consultations, Beirut, 2022, p. 85.
12. Hassan Nafaa, *Egypt and the Arab-Israeli conflict from the inevitable conflict to the impossible settlement*, 2nd ed., Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1986, p. 26.
13. Muhammad Khawaja, *The Israeli War Strategy, A Path and Evolution*, Dar Al-Farabi, Beirut, 2014, p. 46.
14. Abdel Amir Hamid Attia, *The Political Decision and its Impact on the Military Decision in the October 1973 War*, unpublished MA thesis, College of Arts, Iraqi University, 2021, p. 22.
15. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafei, *Introductions to the July 23 Revolution*, p. 349.
16. Rashad Kamel, *Life of Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel Hakim Amer*, Dar Al-Khail, d.m., 2002, p. 34.
17. Abdullah Imam and Wajih Abaza, *Pages from the National Struggle*, p. 345.
18. Maysoun Abbas Hussein al-Jubouri, *The Suez Crisis and the International Situation*, an unpublished MA thesis, College of Education for Girls, University of Baghdad, 2005, p. 179.
19. Anwar Abdel-Malik, *The Egyptian Society and the Army 1952-1967*, Al-Mahrousa Center for Research, Training and Publishing, Maadi, 1998, pp. 159-160.
20. Abdullah Jaylan, *The Secret History of the Yemeni Revolution from 1956 to 1962*, 3rd Edition, Modern Era Publications, Beirut, 1987, p. 91.
21. Ahmed Obaid Dagher, *Yemen under the rule of Imam Ahmed 1948-1963*, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 2005, p. 374.
22. Muhammad al-Badr ibn Ahmad al-Nasir Lidin Allah ibn Yahya ibn Muhammad, born in 1926, is the twenty-first of the Zaidi imams in Yemen and the last of them. See: Fouad Saleh Al-Sayed, *The Greatest Contemporary Events 1900-2014*, Al-Manhal, Beirut, 2014, pg. 446.
23. Miles Copeland, *The Unethical Game of Nations in the Politics of American Power*, translated by: Marwan Khair, Dar Al-Sadiq, d.d., d.t., p. 303.
24. Abdel Moneim Khalil, *Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Abdel Moneim Khalil Contemporary Wars of Egypt*, Al Karma for Publishing and Distribution, Cairo, 2016, p. 105.
25. Muhammad Hamroush, the previous source, part 3, p. 858.
26. Nizar Abaza, *Riad al-Maleh, Atmam Al-Alam Tail For the book of information by Khair al-Din al-Zarkali*, Dar Sader, Beirut, 1999, p. 167.
27. Abdullah Sellal and others, *First Documents on the Yemeni Revolution*, Dar Al-Adab, Beirut, 1985, p. 69.
28. Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, *The Egyptian Role in the Yemen War (1962-1967)*, The Egyptian General Book Organization, Cairo, 1981, p. 484.
29. Salah Al-Din Al-Hadidi, *Witness to the Yemen War*, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 1984, p. 165.
30. Muhammad Fawzy, *The Three Years' War 1967-1970*, Al Karma, Cairo, 2016, p. 37.
31. Muhammad Abdul Ghani Al Jasmi, *Al Jasmi's Memoirs (October War 1973)*, General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo, 1998, p. 62.
32. Yevgeny Primakov, *Secret Behind the scenes of the Middle East (the first half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century)*, translated by: Nabil Rashwan, The National Center for Translation, Cairo, 2016, p. 135.
33. Mansour Fayez, *My Journey with Abdel Nasser*, 2nd Edition, Dar Al-Multaqa for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, 1998, pp. 44-45.
34. Adeb Nassour, previous source, pp. 115-116.
35. Amir Al-Omari, *Personally and Films from the Cinema Era*, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 2010, p. 77.
36. Faisal Jalloul, *Egypt through the eyes of the French*, Arab House of Science, Cairo, 2007, p. 114.